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i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and 
Dispositions in Lower Courts: 
This is a case where Johnson-Bowles, a securities broker-
dealer, and Marlen Johnson, a securities agent (collectively 
referred to as "the Johnsons"), were sanctioned by the Utah 
Division of Securities (the "Division") for dishonest and unethical 
practices in the securities business. Following a formal hearing 
and administrative review, the Division suspended the Johnsons' 
licenses for one year and placed the Johnsons on an additional two 
years probation. The Johnsons appealed to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, which upheld the Division's actions. Following a petition 
for rehearing by the Johnsons, the Court of Appeals issued an 
Amended Opinion on February 19, 1992, which differed in a few 
respects from the original opinion, but which likewise upheld the 
Division's actions. The Johnsons' current petition for writ of 
certiorari is from that February 19th Amended Opinion of the Court 
of Appeals. 
Statement of the Facts: 
The Division basically agrees with the facts and procedural 
history as stated in the Amended Opinion of the Court of Appeals on 
pages 1-6 and as found by Securities Advisory Board and the 
Director of the Division in the Division's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order of August 10, 1990. 
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Put simply, the Johnsons engaged in a "short sale"1 of U.S.A. 
Medical stock at a time when they knew or should have known that 
the stock was being manipulated.2 They misjudged the situation, 
and the price of the stock continued to rise rapidly. This meant 
that the Johnsons would have to cover their short sale with much 
more expensive stock. The entities to whom the Johnsons owed stock 
then began the process of "buying-in"3 the stock that the Johnsons 
owed to them. The Johnsons next went to the United States District 
Court and sought a preliminary injunction from Judge Green to 
prevent any buy-ins of stock to cover their short position. The 
preliminary injunction was denied because Judge Green, instead of 
viewing the Johnsons as innocent victims of stock manipulation, 
ruled that the Johnsons knew or should have known of the 
XA "short sale" occurs when a person sells stock, to be 
delivered at a particular future date, that the person does not 
currently own. The person must then buy an equivalent amount of 
stock before the delivery date. If the price of the stock drops 
during the interim between the sale date and the delivery date, 
then the person makes money, while an increase in the stock price 
before the delivery date causes the person to lose money. If the 
person fails to deliver the stock on time, then the party who 
originally purchased the short sale stock is allowed to "buy-in" 
enough stock from some third party to cover the amount of stock 
owed, and the cost of the buy-in stock is then charged to the 
person who made the short sale. 
2When stock is being manipulated, its price will tend to rise, 
often as a result of phony press hype and artificial trades between 
nominee owners of the stock who are really controlled by the 
manipulators. Once the price is deemed high enough, the 
manipulators sell their stock to the public, after which the price 
usually nosedives rapidly. If an individual suspected 
manipulation, and believed that the price had reached its peak, 
that individual could sell short in the hopes of making a large 
profit by purchasing the stock to cover the short sale after its 
price had plummeted. 
3
 See, footnote 1, supra. 
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manipulation at the time they engaged in the short sale. 
In part in response to the evidence introduced at the hearing 
before Judge Green, the Division placed a Stop Trading Order on the 
stock of U.S.A. Medical, Inc. The Johnsons then purchased U.S.A. 
Medical stock that they knew could not legally be sold due to the 
Stop Trading Order. They purchased the stock for over $506,000 
less than they believed the stock would have cost before the Stop 
Trading Order made sales of the stock illegal. Because the 
Johnsons' acts of knowingly helping others to violate the Stop 
Trading Order constituted dishonest and unethical practices in the 
securities business, the Division undertook a formal administrative 
proceeding and sanctioned the Johnsons by suspending their licenses 
for one year and placing them on two years probation. 
ARGUMENT 
At its Heart, the Johnsons' Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari is Nothing More than an Attempt to Reargue the 
Facts of the Case: 
There are basically two views as to the facts in this case. 
One view is the view summarized in the preceding section of this 
brief* That view has been adopted by every person and body who has 
reviewed this matter (except, of course, for the Johnsons and their 
counsel). Based on this view of the evidence, the Court of 
Appeals' Amended Opinion is eminently rational. 
The other view is the view argued for by the Johnsons in their 
petition. Under this view, the Johnsons are merely innocent 
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victims to a fraud, who after uncovering the fraud were further 
victimized by the Division when the Johnsons attempted to honor 
their contracts by purchasing stock. Most importantly, the 
Johnsons, under this theory, were placed in an irreconcilable 
conflict between the Divisions' Stop Trading Order and the NASD's 
requirement that the Johnsons honor their contracts. 
Every argument raised by the Johnsons in their petition 
hinges, either directly or indirectly, on the Utah Supreme Court 
reviewing the facts and accepting the Johnsons' view over the view 
of Judge Green, the Division, and the Court of Appeals. Such a 
fact finding exercise is not an appropriate basis for an appeal by 
writ of certiorari. That is particularly the case here, where the 
Johnsons' central tenant, that they were placed in an 
irreconcilable conflict between the Division and NASD, is simply 
not true. 
The Johnsons were never Required to Choose Between 
Violating NASD Rules or Assisting in the Violation of the 
Division's Stop Trading Order: 
As recognized by the Division in its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, pages 8-9, ,f[t]he proper scope and 
operative effect of the [Stop Trading] Order entered by the 
Division was to prohibit any trading of U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
securities within this state." Thus, the Division's Stop Trading 
Order prevented the Johnsons from engaging in transactions in 
U.S.A. Medical stock in Utah. At the very least, the Stop Trading 
Order prevented any Utah resident from selling U.S.A. Medical stock 
to the Johnsons, and the Johnsons' participation in such a sale 
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would be unethical even if it were not illegal. 
NASD rules require that a member honor all trades, including 
short sales. But, as the Johnsons readily admit, the NASD 
recognizes buy-ins as a legitimate way to settle accounts when a 
broker who sold short cannot make timely delivery of the stock 
owed. See, Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, footnote 1. 
It would therefore have been perfectly legal and proper for 
the Johnsons, who were prohibited from purchasing stock in Utah to 
cover their short positions, to have allowed buy-ins by the parties 
to whom they owed the stock. The Johnsons would then have owed 
those parties for the price of the buy-ins. (Of course, if the 
Johnsons felt that they were victims of manipulation, they could 
then sue those who were manipulating the stock for the losses 
incurred by the Johnsons.) The only problem with that scenario is 
that the Johnsons assert that they could not have afforded the 
price of the buy-ins. Even assuming that the Johnsons would have 
been driven out of business by having to pay for the buy-ins, that 
error in business judgment4 does not constitute a conflict between 
4At its core, the Johnsons' decision to buy so much of the 
highly volatile U.S.A. Medical penny stock was a bad business 
decision. Before becoming a market maker in the stock, Johnson-
Bowles was required to do extensive due diligence into the stock's 
background. As a result, the Johnsons either knew or should have 
known that the stock was being manipulated, as Judge Green found. 
If the Johnsons knew that the stock was being manipulated, then 
they are of course culpable themselves. If they did not know of 
the manipulation, then they were negligent in their due diligence 
review. In either case, the Johnsons apparently bought far more 
U.S.A. Medical stock than was prudent in light of Johnson-Bowies' 
financial condition. U.S.A. Medical was a high technology start up 
company that was actively developing (and beginning to market) 
certain medical devices. Any number of events, such as receiving 
a patent, receiving an offer of merger from a large medical 
- 5 -
the Division saying, on the one hand, that you cannot trade in a 
security that is the subject of manipulation and NASD saying, on 
the other hand, that you must honor your short sale contract by 
paying for necessary buy-ins of the stock. 
This Case does not meet the Criteria for Supreme Court 
Review by Writ of Certiorari: 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth 
the considerations that govern Supreme Court review by writ of 
certiorari. Certiorari should only be granted -'for special and 
important reasons." Of the four examples given in Rule 46, three 
are clearly not relevant: There is no need to reconcile a conflict 
between two Court of Appeals decisions with respect to the same 
issue of law, there is no conflict between the Court of Appeals 
decision and a decision of the Supreme Court, and the Court of 
Appeals decision does not so far depart from the usual course of 
judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the Supreme 
Court's supervisory power. 
Likewise, the Amended Opinion by the Court of Appeals, while 
it will have some general usefulness in the area of securities law, 
does not decide important new questions that require the Supreme 
Court's review. Instead, the analytical portion of the decision is 
largely an application of the somewhat unusual facts of this case 
equipment manufacturer, or developing a new breakthrough product, 
could have easily legitimately driven up the price of the stock 
tenfold or more in a very short period of time. If the price of 
the stock had shot up under those legitimate circumstances, 
Johnson-Bowles apparently would have been unable to cover its short 
positions and would have been forced out of business. It was 
foolhardy of the Johnsons to have put so much money into a short 
sale of stock in such a company. 
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to fairly well established existing law, albeit law that has not 
always been previously applied in a securities case. For example, 
much of the Amended Opinion is given over to a case specific 
analysis of basic principles of due process, the sufficiency of the 
evidence, and the application of the law to the facts. The only 
parts of the Amended Opinion that really addresses a "new" issue 
are the parts about federal preemption and the scope of the 
commerce clause. The Court of Appeals deals with those issues in 
entirely predictable ways. There is no federal preemption where 
the federal legislation clearly expressly allows for state 
regulation, which is consistent in purpose with the federal 
regulation. There is no commerce clause problem where a state 
regulates the sale of securities within its borders. There is no 
need for the Supreme Court to review those nearly inevitable 
conclusions. 
What is really being sought here is not a review of some 
shocking new legal theory, but rather a review of the facts of this 
case and how those facts ought to apply to the law. In that sense, 
the Johnsons seek nothing more than a second bite at the appellate 
apple, which is not the purpose of a certiorari review. 
If a Writ of Certiorari is Granted, it Should be 
Carefully Limited: 
The Johnsons have had a tendency to raise every conceivable 
issue, whether well founded or not, at every conceivable juncture 
of this litigation. For example, they raises over thirty distinct 
grounds for reversal in their Court of Appeals brief, which ran 
eighty-three pages, exclusive of addendum. Most of those arguments 
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were simply deemed by the Court of Appeals to be without merits and 
not worthy of analysis. Likewise, the thirty-five page Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari spends four pages simply listing a plethora 
of possible issues for review on certiorari. Needless to say, it 
is practically impossible to adequately and fully respond to such 
a shotgun-type appeal in a reasonable time or within reasonable 
page limits. 
The Division does feels that this case does not warrant a writ 
of certiorari. If the Supreme Court, in its discretion, feels that 
a writ of certiorari is appropriate, then the Division would 
request that the Court take it upon itself to carefully define and 
limit the issues to be reviewed. Given the procedural history of 
this case, appropriate guidance from the Court in limiting the 
scope to the review to the issues that concern the Court will 
result in a much better focuses set of briefs and oral arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should deny the Johnsons' Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari. The Petition is primarily a diatribe against 
factfinding with which the Johnsons disagree. The key premise of 
the Petition, that the Johnsons were placed in an irreconcilable 
conflict between their duties to the Division and to NASD, is 
simply not true. If the Court decides that it wishes to review 
this case, it should limit the writ to the specific question or 
questions that concern the Court. Under no circumstances should 
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the writ be granted carte blanc on the multitude of possible issues 
suggested in the Johnsons' Petition. 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of April, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID N. SONNENREICH 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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